While scholars have dedicated attention to questions of NGO formation, activity, and impact on the international system (see Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Welch, 2001; Mathews, 1997) , there has been relatively little critical evaluation of the factual and legal claims in NGO reports. AI and HRW present an unrealistic depiction • of the factors influencing targeting decisions on the modern battlefield. They fall prey to the "allure of precision" that leads "those beyond the battlefield [to] impose unreasonable demands on the military or postulate norms that go beyond treaty or custom" (Schmitt, 2004, p. 466) . 
A b s t r a c t
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T a b l e o f C o n t e n t s Yet despite the growing importance of information generated by NGOs regarding the behavior of parties to conflicts, the content of NGO reports has been subject to relatively little scrutiny. It appears that the positive values associated with the mission to promote human rights, along with the idiom of international law, have a tendency to engender positive and uncritical judgments regarding the substantive claims made in these reports.
Given the growing impact of NGO activities, which can affect the security and standing of states, and criminal prosecutions against individuals, it is critical that careful analyses be undertaken of their reporting and claims. Scholars have, to a large degree, ignored this path of inquiry, dedicating their attention instead to questions of NGO formation, activity, and impact on the international system (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Welch, 2001; Mathews, 1997 1 For example, while AI was the most influential NGO in the campaign to stop British arms sales to Israel following the Gaza fighting, HRW performed much of the detailed research underlying a number of AI's claims. This is not to suggest that the two organizations are formally working in concert, but simply that their products in a number of cases have a complementary character.
2 Unless otherwise indicated, all references to "the NGOs" in this monograph refer to AI and HRW.
3 Of course, there are many debates as to what LOAC, both that deriving from treaty and from customary law, demands. Customary international law, however, requires a fairly high degree of consensus among practitioners in order to be considered binding, whatever the exact threshold may be (Dinstein, 2004; British FCO, 2009 (Shivji, 2007; Mutua, 2001; Nunnenkamp, 2008) , and while the "democratic deficit" affecting these organizations has been noted (Upadhyay, 2003) NGOs are willing and eager to provide this "service, " and at a low cost to the outsourcer. Given the many claims on their resources, and initial impressions derived from media and NGO reporting, decision-makers often have little time or inclination to subject the information they receive to critical examination.
However, as with every outsourcing operation, there must be a mechanism for quality control. This is especially true where the "service" is as complex as evaluating compliance with LOAC, and where the consequences can affect the security of states and the prosecution of individuals.
NGO Methodology for Establishing Claims of Israeli LOAC Violations
In generating claims of Israeli wrongdoing, AI and HRW generally take three steps: 1) They present the "evidence" − cases, testimony, the results of investigations, etc.; 2) 17 In the words of Garraway, "What has emerged is that the principles contained in Additional Protocol I are for the most part fully reflective of customary international law. This is not surprising but of course much of Additional Protocol I contains language that is at best vague and in some cases ambiguous" (p. 2).
18 It will therefore be unnecessary to decide whether the conflict in Gaza should be defined as international or non-international, at least insofar as the question of which of the two Additional Protocols applies. Israel's Unlawful Use of White Phosphorus in Gaza. " claims that Israel's use of WP in some cases violated the prohibition on disproportionate attacks, and that the evidence "strongly suggests" that the substance was used unlawfully as an incendiary. These various claims will be addressed in turn.
Feasible Precautions in Attack
Article 57 (2) For states not party to AP-I, the customary law standard regarding precautions in attack has not been well defined.
It is "certainly not higher than the 'do everything feasible' standard imposed by Protocol I" (Rogers, 2000) . The The military consideration most often at play in the decision to deploy smoke obscurants is force protection.
This tactic serves to obscure troops, disrupt enemy lines 25 Para. 2 of Art. 52 reads, "Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage."
26 Sub-article iii reiterates the rule of proportionality in terms of precautions that must be taken when planning an attack. The rule is first presented in Art. 51(5)(b), as a type of (prohibited) indiscriminate attack. (Yates, 2009; Lamb, 2006) . This is in contradiction to LOAC standards, which require that a commander's actions be judged based on the information "reasonably available to him at the relevant time. " 34 HRW (p. 13, n. 6) notes that WP is advantageous due to its ability to interfere with the infrared spectrum, thus blocking the "infra-red tracking systems used in anti-tank guided missiles (AGTMs). " Its report continues, "However, … HRW found no evidence that Hamas fired
AGTMs. " Even assuming it is correct, this contention is based on an analysis of the fighting carried out once the fog of war had cleared. It was public knowledge that the Israeli defense establishment had reason to assume that
Hamas had acquired AGTMs employing laser and infrared targeting systems prior to the Gaza fighting (Eshel, 2007; Harel, 2007 Therefore, its repeated use in such a manner "is a war crime" (Ibid.). HRW explains that the concern generated by Israel's WP use "is amplified given the method of … air-bursting white phosphorus projectiles. Air-bursting spreads burning wedges in a radius up to 125 meters from the blast point, thereby exposing more civilians and civilian objects to potential harm than a localized ground burst" (p. 64).
32 Yates notes that WP is "used almost daily by British forces in Afghanistan."
33 Professor Steven Haines, head of the Security and Law Programme at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, expressed to the author his understanding that the official position of the UK is that WP should not be used directly against enemy combatants, but can be used against appropriate military objectives, including those located in populated areas (personal communication, Jan. 17, 2009 
34 See Section 5.1 (UAVs; Feasible Steps) below for a more expansive discussion of the LOAC principle whereby a commander's decision must be judged in light of the information reasonably available at the time, rather than with hindsight.
He testified that "the quality of smoke produced by white phosphorous is superb. You will never match it. So, if you want real smoke for real coverage, white phosphorous will give it to you. I don't think that's heresy" ("Public Hearings-Geneva, " July 7, 2009 
36
Even if AI and HRW would claim that their reports were referring to the less common type of ground-burst WP shell, which uses a base-ejection rather than a point-detonation mechanism, they offer no evidence that ground-bursting would have been effective for force protection purposes.
As 35 The M825 shell itself does create a danger to those on the ground by breaking into two or three parts and falling from a high altitude. The threat from the falling shell would have to be weighed against that from the numerous metal fragments of the exploding ground-burst phosphorus shell. 36 The fact that Israel did use base-ejection white phosphorus shells, whose felt wedges do not penetrate hard structures and which give off most of their potentially incendiary material during their descent, strongly indicates that Israel was not intending to use WP as an incendiary. There is a debate among scholars whether military advantage in AP-I should be understood as referring to the attack as a whole or only to a particular action or movement (Neuman, 2004 There are numerous aspects to these NGO claims, and many factors must be taken into account in analyzing them.
The claims and charges are, of course, interconnected in various ways. However, for the purposes of undertaking an analysis, it will be useful to separate them into two distinct arguments. 2) The targets of these attacks turned out to be civilians.
3) Given that UAVs were used, Israel should have found it feasible to verify that its intended targets were civilians and not militants, and refrain from attack.
Therefore Israel must have failed in its LOAC duty to do everything feasible to verify the nature of its targets. Given this failure, its targeting was reckless and unlawful.
The first part of the following analysis will point out the numerous factual and legal difficulties in AI and HRW's claims regarding elements 1 and 3 of this argument. The veracity of the second element will be addressed in the discussion of Argument 2 (see below).
40 All references to HRW in Section 5 refer to "Precisely Wrong" unless otherwise specified.
41 "UCAV" is sometimes used to describe a UAV that has been armed for use in an offensive capacity. 42 This last charge is usually phrased as "the evidence indicates," or "may have," rather than leveled outright. 2) There were no military objectives in the area that may have been the intended target.
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3) The civilians, then, must have been the intended target.
4) Israel did or should have known that the targets were civilian.
Therefore Israel must have failed to distinguish between civilians and combatants, or intentionally targeted civilians.
The second part of the analysis will show the problematic nature of elements 1, 2, and 3 of this argument (element 4 is addressed in relation to Argument 1).
Feasible Steps to Verify Nature of Objective
The LOAC requirement to take all feasible steps to verify the status of a target finds expression in Article 57 (2) 43 The clause continues, "… or that the attack may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated."
First, contrary to their claims, the organizations have little proof that UAV-launched missiles were actually used in any of the attacks they describe.
HRW's "Precisely Wrong" report goes to great lengths in each of the incidents it documents to show that the armament apparently used in the strike was the Spike missile, produced by Rafael Advanced Defense Systems
Ltd. It takes this as an indication that the strike was launched from a UAV. The report asserts, "In Gaza, Israel used both the Hermes and Heron drones armed with a Spike" (p. 12). Its source for this assertion is an "e-mail from Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation quoting a Jane's Defence Weekly staffer" (p. 12, n. 14).
In fact, there is no proof that Israel has ever used the Spike missile in an aerial capacity. The HRW report describes numerous metals cubes that were allegedly found in the vicinity of the area where the missile hit, and then claims that these must have been from the Spike. While AI does not go into detail as to the evidence supporting its claims that particular strikes were launched from UAVs, its assertions also seem to be largely based on the presence of "the tiny cube-shaped metal shrapnel from the missiles usually fired by drones" (p. 19).
44
The NGO reports appear to be describing the use of an antipersonnel warhead with a fragmentation sleeve (Defense Even if it is correct that the missiles used were of the Spike variety, and even if it is true that the Hermes and/or Heron drones employed by the IDF were armed with the Spike, 45 this in no way proves or even indicates that the missiles in any of the attacks were launched from UAVs. As Rafael's brochure for the Spike missiles explains, the Spike "was designed to be mounted on combat vehicles, helicopters, and naval vessels" (Rafael, "SPIKE Family") . Israel used all of these platforms extensively in the Gaza fighting.
The HRW report attempts to address this problematic Beyond the particular platform from which a strike was launched, numerous factors must be considered in evaluating whether a commander, in deciding to launch that strike, took adequate steps to determine that it was lawful. These factors, which are reflective of the nature of modern combat, are recognized by LOAC but ignored or misrepresented in the NGO reports. AI and HRW's reports tend to be replete instead with irrelevant technical information and emotional details, which do not impact on the lawfulness of Israeli actions.
The duty to verify whether a potential target is a legitimate military objective is qualified by the feasibility standard.
A commander must "do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked" are not civilian (AP-I, Article 57(2)(a)(i)). As was shown in the above section on WP, a commander is entitled to take both military and humanitarian factors into account when deciding what is feasible, and to give due consideration to force protection.
The degree to which it is feasible for a commander to determine the civilian or military status of a potential target is greatly influenced both by the means available to her and the nature of the fighting in which she is engaged.
Even the most advanced weapons are rarely as accurate Officer Advanced Course (n.d.) explains, "All battlefields require commanders to make and execute decisions faster than the enemy" (2.f). The modern battlefield is "placing even more emphasis on quick decision-making, particularly those decisions related to targeting" (Holland, 2004, p. 37) . This is true regardless of the technical means available.
The NGOs fail to take into account the distinction between "planned" and "immediate" targets, and between those that are merely "unplanned" and those that are "unanticipated" (see Schmitt, 2005) LOAC recognizes that in the case of "emerging targets, "
there may not be time to undertake complex verification procedures. Rather, predetermined criteria will have to be used in order to quickly evaluate the status of an objective (Queguiner, 2006 should choose not to carry out a strike, this does not seem to be customary law.
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The recognition that combat decisions must often be taken quickly and under conditions of great uncertainty has led treaty framers and states to emphasize that those decisions must not be evaluated based on hindsight.
Rather, the evaluation must be carried out from 
Legitimate Military Objectives and Collateral Damage
In contending that the IDF intentionally or recklessly 
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As an example, the HRW report on the strike that hit the Masharawi family home in Gaza City records, "According 51 The decision by NATO to conduct its bombing campaign against Yugoslavia from a height of 15,000 feet would seem to indicate that AI's contention is contrary to state practice. In one instance, NATO's decision to conduct air strikes from that height led to civilian tractors being mistakenly identified as military vehicles and bombed. In another instance, a NATO plane launched a second strike on a bridge despite knowing that a civilian train was on it, and despite the bridge being obscured by smoke as a result of the first strike. In neither case did the Review Committee find sufficient grounds to prosecute for war crimes. (See Review Committee, 2000.) 52 This is assuming that the casualties were actually civilians. It appears that in numerous instances, Hamas militants blended in with the civilian population, while in others they were presented as civilians on casualty lists. 55 While it may be admirable that HRW chose to note that in this case its witnesses appeared to be lying, in other cases it fails to do so.
attacks from civilian areas but when they do take cover behind a civilian house or building to fire, it does not make that building and its civilian inhabitants a legitimate 56 It also raises the question as to whether AI believes that it would have been better had Israel not removed civilians from the sites of urban street battles. Those repeating NGO arguments, such as journalists and diplomats, should pay greater attention to attempts at "standard setting" within NGO reports. 59 NGOs do and should play a significant role in the development of international law, including in the evolution of its standards.
Yet when undertaking an evaluation of whether a country has complied with the requirements of international law, it is crucial to judge based on the current state of the law, and not on what the particular NGO might prefer it to be.
Policy-makers should subject the information they receive from NGOs to more critical scrutiny before allowing it to influence their decisions. NGOs such as HRW and AI certainly have an important role to play in informing government officials, diplomats, and the public, particularly regarding areas to which others have less access. Subjecting NGO reports and statements to careful analysis will help ensure that these are produced at the highest standards, without being influenced by ideological predispositions or selection biases. In this way, NGOs such as AI and HRW will be able to most effectively carry out their mission of promoting and protecting human rights.
58 See G. M. Steinberg, "Soft Powers Play Hardball: NGOs Wage War Against Israel," for a critical analysis of the role of ideological biases in NGO reporting, particularly with reference to the Arab-Israeli arena ("Israel Affairs," vol. 12, No. 4, Oct. 2006), pp. 748-768. 59 C. E. Welch (2001) uses the term "standard setting" to describe NGO involvement in the creation of human rights instruments.
Here the term is expanded to include efforts to determine how those instruments should be interpreted.
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